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Panarchy and Adaptive Change: Around the Loop 
and Back Again 
Bradley C. Karkkainen* 
I.  PANARCHY AND PROGRESS 
I am both honored and a bit humbled to comment on C.S. 
“Buzz” Holling’s contribution to this issue.  Holling’s influence 
on environmental and natural resources law and policy over 
the past several decades has been enormous.  Holling pioneered 
the concept of “adaptive management”—or Adaptive 
Environmental Assessment and Management (AEAM) as he 
first dubbed it in his seminal 1978 work on the subject1—as a 
scientifically defensible, learning-by-doing, incremental and 
iterative approach to improving our understanding of complex 
ecosystems, leading to improvements in our ability to manage 
environmental problems in their proper ecological context. 
Holling developed the adaptive management concept in 
response to his own frustrations as a scientist and frequent 
participant in interdisciplinary environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) teams in the 1970s.2  The standard EIA 
approach calls for a comprehensive and synoptic environmental 
analysis and assessment, legally required as a prerequisite to 
any governmental action that “significantly affects” 
environmental quality.3  Typically, however, only a fraction of 
                                                          
       ©     2005 Bradley C. Karkkainen.        
       *   Professor and Henry J. Fletcher Chair, University of Minnesota Law 
School. 
 1. See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. 
Holling ed., 1978). 
 2. Id. at 1-2. 
 3. See National Environmental Policy Act §102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 
4332(2)(C) (2000) (requiring federal agencies to “include in every 
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal 
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a 
detailed statement” on environmental impacts and alternatives to the 
proposed action). 
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the information needed to make such a comprehensive 
assessment is readily available.  Data gaps are pervasive, 
scientific understanding of even the most basic ecological 
processes is often incomplete, and the integrative analyses rest 
on crude, untested, incomplete, and necessarily speculative 
ecosystem models stitched together from spotty data and 
disparate scraps of research findings from a variety of scientific 
disciplines.  Worse, the validity of the predictions generated by 
these models is rarely tested against real-world outcomes due 
to a paucity of post-project monitoring.  Consequently, 
scientists have little opportunity to refine or adjust their 
models over time. 
Holling believed such efforts led neither to better scientific 
understanding nor to well-informed agency decisionmaking.  
For their part, agency managers seemed to have little concern 
for the accuracy of the assessments generated by this jerry-
rigged process, so long as the legally mandatory procedures 
were followed.4  As a legal matter, it is procedure and not 
substance that matters in environmental impact assessment in 
the United States.5 
A more scientifically defensible approach, Holling argued, 
would be to treat environmental impact assessment not as a 
once-off, purely predictive exercise, but rather as an ongoing, 
interdisciplinary, scientific inquiry.6  Teams of scientists would 
construct integrative models based upon the best data and 
research currently available, then identify gaps and 
uncertainties in their models and generate testable hypotheses 
designed to fill the gaps and reduce the uncertainties.  Working 
with managers, the scientists would then design management 
interventions as scientific experiments carefully tailored to 
                                                          
 4. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, at 
iii (1997) (concluding that many agencies act “as if the detailed statement 
called for in the statute is an end in itself, rather than a tool to enhance and 
improve decision-making”). 
 5. See A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 213, 239 (2004) (describing NEPA as a “striking 
example of the dominance of procedure over substance,” a condition traceable 
to early court decisions holding that only the statute’s procedural provisions 
were judicially enforceable). 
 6. See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, 
supra note 1, at 133 (“Prediction and traditional ‘environmental impact 
assessments’ suppose that there is a ‘before and after,’ whereas environmental 
management is an ongoing process. . . . Environmental assessment should be 
an ongoing investigation into, not a one-time prediction of, impacts.”). 
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field-test their hypotheses against observed outcomes.  The 
results of these “adaptive management” experiments would 
feed back into further refinements of the ecological models, 
generating subsequent rounds of testable hypotheses.  Iterative 
application of this method, Holling argued, would lead to 
rolling improvements in scientific understanding and 
contribute in turn to better informed and continuously 
improving management decisions.7 
It took the better part of two decades for the adaptive 
management concept to catch on in natural resources 
management, and we are yet to appreciate its full implications.  
Although many leading scientists and natural resources 
management professionals now see the need for some form of 
adaptive management as axiomatic,8 even the most well-funded 
and technically sophisticated ecosystem management efforts, 
like those in the Florida Everglades and the San Francisco 
Bay-Delta, are still struggling, often awkwardly and 
uncertainly, to integrate adaptive management principles.9 
Environmental law and policy scholars are several steps 
                                                          
 7. See id. at 11-16 (describing principal elements in an Adaptive 
Environmental Assessment and Management approach). 
 8. See Fred Bosselman, A Role for State Planning: Intergenerational 
Equity and Adaptive Management, 12 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 323-25 
(2001) (describing rising prominence of adaptive management in ecological 
science); A. Dan Tarlock, Putting Rivers Back in the Landscape: The Revival of 
Watershed Management in the United States, 6 HASTINGS W.-NW. J.  ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y 167, 189-92 (2002) (describing the shift in natural resources 
management toward regional ecosystem-scale efforts at integrated 
management, predicated upon adaptive management strategies). 
 9. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON RESTORATION OF THE 
GREATER EVERGLADES ECOSYSTEM, ADAPTIVE MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT 
FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE EVERGLADES RESTORATION PLAN 9 (2003) 
(concluding that monitoring, assessment, and passive adaptive management 
plans for the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Project are scientifically 
defensible, but should be augmented with active adaptive management and 
measures to ensure that information reaches key decisionmakers); Thomas T. 
Ankerson & Richard Hamman, Ecosystem Management and the Everglades: A 
Legal and Institutional Analysis, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 473, 500  (1996) 
(concluding that “the implementation of adaptive management policies is 
problematic [in the Everglades] under the current environmental regulatory 
framework” which is predicated upon a static approach to environmental 
management); J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management Seriously: A Case 
Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KANSAS L. REV. 1249, 1265-67 
(2004) (stating that despite its professed commitment to an adaptive 
management approach, the CALFED Bay-Delta program recently 
acknowledged that it had failed to conduct regular status monitoring on the 
endangered Delta smelt, a necessary predicate for meaningful adaptive 
management). 
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further behind the curve.  We are only now beginning to debate 
the meaning and merits of adaptive management in a serious 
way and to appreciate the profound and far-reaching challenge 
it poses to more familiar fragmentary, fixed-rule approaches to 
law and regulation.  J.B. Ruhl’s contribution to this issue is an 
important intervention in that debate,10 which I discuss below. 
Now Buzz Holling has come forth with a new and equally 
revolutionary concept, “panarchy.”  I confess that at first blush 
I am not entirely certain what to make of it, and suspect I am 
not alone in that regard.  Perhaps we legal scholars are just a 
bit slow on the uptake, but Holling appears once again to be 
way out ahead of us, setting his sights on some distant and 
dimly perceived horizon of knowledge.  And as with adaptive 
management, it may take us another twenty years to catch up.  
Holling, if you will pardon the analogy, is the Lance Armstrong 
of the adaptive change cycle; we feel privileged just to be 
somewhere far back in the pack chasing him, however futile 
may be the effort to catch him. 
“Panarchy,” as Holling and his colleagues describe it, is a 
cycle of adaptive change, proceeding through “forward-loop” 
stages of innovation, growth, exploitation, consolidation, 
predictability, and conservation, followed by “back-loop” phases 
of instability, release, collapse, experimentation, novel 
recombination, and reorganization.11  At that point the cycle 
begins anew, moving once again through the forward loop, 
albeit beginning from a new starting point.  Holling and friends 
schematize this cycle by simplifying it to four phases: 
exploitation, conservation, release, and reorganization.12  This 
cycle, they argue, generally characterizes processes of adaptive 
change in both ecological and social systems.13 
So far, so good.  From there, though, the story becomes 
vexingly complex.  These adaptive cycles, Holling tells us, 
operate simultaneously on multiple spatial and temporal 
scales, and across scales.  Consequently, “major learned 
                                                          
 10. J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 21 (2005). 
 11. See C.S. Holling & Lance H. Gunderson, Resilience and Adaptive 
Cycles, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND 
NATURAL SYSTEMS 25, 33-40, 47-49 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 
2002) [hereinafter PANARCHY]; C.S. Holling, From Complex Regions to 
Complex Worlds, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Complex 
Regions]. 
 12. Holling & Gunderson, supra note 11, at 34 fig.2-1. 
 13. See id. at 62. 
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benefits need not, and generally do not stay in the place where 
they were created,” but instead “flourish elsewhere.”14  Thus 
successful local-scale innovations might create new 
opportunities that are absorbed into larger forward-loop 
learning processes, and become diffused across larger spatial 
and temporal scales.  By the same token, collapse at small 
scales might contribute to cascades of destabilization and 
collapse across larger scales.  Or, locally adaptive successes 
might in some circumstances prove disruptive of larger scales 
of forward-loop self-organization, triggering a flip into back-
loop instability and collapse at the larger scale.15 
Holling and his colleagues claim to have documented the 
recurrence of these cyclical patterns in numerous ecological 
settings,16 and they cite a variety of social science literature 
and anecdotal accounts to argue that the pattern is generally 
replicated in human social systems as well.17 
Ultimately, of course, the panarchy thesis rests on a series 
of large empirical claims.  Those claims, while plausible and 
intriguing, are difficult to verify or to rebut from the vantage 
point of a law professor’s desktop, and therefore I have no 
choice but to remain agnostic—at least for now.  A few 
comments are nonetheless in order. 
The panarchy thesis, as I understand it, is posited as a 
general characteristic of cycles of adaptive change.  This lends 
a note of determinism and inevitability, something like an Iron 
Rule of the Figure-8 (or “double-loop”) pattern of system 
change.  Holling and colleagues are quick to disclaim a strongly 
deterministic interpretation of their own thesis, labeling it a 
“metaphor” rather than a “rigid, predetermined path.”18  But a 
                                                          
 14. See Complex Regions, supra note 11, at 4. 
 15. See Holling & Gunderson, supra note 11, at 60-61 (arguing that locally 
adaptive strategies may sometimes have maladaptive large-scale 
consequences, as when efforts to stabilize resource production reduce diversity 
and resilience, leading to collapse in the larger system). 
 16. See id. at 35-38 & box 2-2 (describing this adaptive change cycle in 
several ecosystem contexts). 
 17. Id. at 38, 55-60 & box 2-5 (describing adaptive change cycle in 
corporate management); Fikret Berkes & Carl Folke, Back to the Future: 
Ecosystem Dynamics and Local Knowledge, in PANARCHY, supra note 11, at 
121-46 (describing panarchic adaptive changes cycles in local and traditional 
natural resources management regimes). 
 18. See Holling & Gunderson, supra note 11, at 51 (“The adaptive cycle in 
its most general form is a metaphor and should not be read as a rigid, 
predetermined path and trajectory—for ecosystems at least, let alone 
economies and organizations.”). 
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metaphor for what?  Presumably, it is a metaphor for an 
observed phenomenon that, according to their thesis, recurs 
with predictable regularity.  Holling’s own writings elsewhere 
suggest that the exact course and direction that change takes 
in any particular complex dynamic system will necessarily be 
unpredictable, nonlinear, and stochastic,19 yet the panarchy 
thesis seems to imply that change, however unpredictable in 
the particulars, will always (or almost always) follow a familiar 
and predictable progression of steps.  The pattern, and the 
pattern alone, is presented as certain and more or less 
inescapable.  Why that should be is never fully explained.  To 
that extent, although highly abstract, the panarchy thesis 
seems a bit undertheorized. 
Next, it is not entirely clear what to make of the role of 
human agency in a panarchic world, especially as it applies to 
human social systems.  Certainly we humans play a pivotal role 
in social systems—and for that matter, in most ecological 
systems, too, given our power to dominate and displace other 
species and to disrupt or alter ecological processes.20  
Sometimes our impact stems from, or at least is modified by, 
conscious, intelligence-informed acts.  Presumably, then, our 
understanding of the dynamics of system change itself has the 
potential to change the way we act within the system, thereby 
altering the trajectory of system change—though perhaps, 
given complexity, nonlinearity, and inherent stochasticity, in 
ways we cannot entirely predict or control.  Holling and 
company do not tell us much about this, sometimes writing as if 
it is simply all beyond our ability to comprehend and manage, 
and we are all just along for the ride on the “Double Loop 
Panarchy Express.” 
                                                          
 19. See C.S. Holling, Fikret Berkes & Carl Folke, Science, Sustainability, 
and Resource Management, in LINKING SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND SOCIAL MECHANISMS FOR BUILDING 
RESILIENCE 342, 352 (Fikret Berkes et al. eds., 1998) (stating that natural 
resources management problems exhibit “aspects of behavior [that] are 
complex and unpredictable and . . . causes, while at times simple (when we 
finally understood), are always multiple”); see also id. at 346-47 (stating that 
in complex natural systems “uncertainty is high,” “knowledge of the system we 
deal with is always incomplete,” “[s]urprise is inevitable,” and “the system 
itself is a moving target”). 
 20. See Frances Westley et al., Why Systems of People and Nature Are Not 
Just Social and Ecological Systems, in PANARCHY, supra note 11, at 104 
(describing competing theories of human domination of ecosystems, all 
predicated upon our unusually large capacity to change or destroy the natural 
environment). 
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The implications seem pretty scary.  It is a bit like being 
trapped on a twenty-first century, high-tech version of a 
double-looping carnival ride, armed with the capacity to fiddle 
with the precise trajectory but only in ultimately unpredictable 
ways, and never able to change the basic pattern of our 
interminable trip: forward, up, around, down, back loop, down, 
around, up, forward again, and the more we try to adjust 
course, the more the pattern stays the same.  It sounds like a 
mad ecologist’s vision of a living hell, a Huis clos21 of adaptive 
change. 
Holling’s earlier work on adaptive management left more 
room for optimism.  It gave us affirmative reasons to embrace 
epistemic humility.  Recognition that ecological systems are 
simply too complex to fully comprehend may have seemed 
debilitating at first, given a culture of regulation and resource 
management that assumed it was the regulator’s or manager’s 
responsibility to have all the scientifically “correct” answers 
before proceeding.  Complexity thus initially threatened to 
thwart action.  Adaptive management seemed to offer a way 
out of that box: an incremental, scientifically defensible, one-
step-at-a-time methodology for learning as we go, and adjusting 
management measures to incorporate gains in knowledge over 
time. 
Panarchy, on the other hand, conjures up not only intricate 
layers of impenetrable and seemingly unmanageable 
complexity, but also a sense of futility, coupled with less clarity 
and optimism about how to respond.  The panarchy thesis 
seems to imply that all directed, “forward-loop,” human social 
endeavors—adaptive ecosystem management included—are 
doomed to fail eventually, perhaps after an initial period of 
success.  Despite our best efforts, the cycle from innovation 
through growth, exploitation, maturity, stability, and 
conservation appears destined inevitably to stumble into the 
back-loop of destabilization, disorder, and creative destruction.  
Every project, large or small, thus takes on an aspect of the 
labor of Sisyphus—or Bill Murray’s Groundhog Day without 
the happy ending,22 if your tastes run more to pop culture—but 
                                                          
 21. The reference is to Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialist play Huis clos 
(translated as “No Exit”) in which three characters are condemned to spend 
eternity sitting on a couch conversing, even though they cannot stand each 
other. 
 22. Groundhog Day, a 1993 film directed by Harold Ramis, starred comic 
actor Bill Murray as a television weathercaster doomed to spend eternity in 
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either way, it is a gloomy prospect.  If indeed all human 
undertakings are doomed to fail at unexpected times and for 
unanticipated reasons, why bother?  Unless, of course, we are 
so biologically programmed that we have no other choice, which 
is an equally dismal thought. 
But what about the “back loop” of the panarchic cycle?  
That idea has great intuitive appeal.  We have all seen cycles of 
creative destruction, alternating with periods of incremental 
front-loop learning.  The front loop imposes order and stability 
(at least for a while), but at the same time grows increasingly 
vulnerable to disturbance until suddenly everything unravels 
in a flurry of rapid, back-loop, creative disorganization, 
reorganization, and reconfiguration, leading to innovation, re-
synthesis, and a new front-loop developmental pattern.  It is on 
the back loop that the most creative and far-reaching changes 
are often inaugurated in the midst of seeming chaos and 
disintegration.  This is no less true in law than in other fields of 
human endeavor.  It took the American Revolution and a 
subsequent period of futility under the Articles of 
Confederation (back loop) to spawn a long period of relative 
stability under the United States Constitution (front loop); the 
Civil War (back loop) to generate the Reconstruction 
Amendments, a long period of slowly accumulating federal 
constitutional primacy, and steady advances in civil rights and 
civil liberties (front loop); the Great Depression (back loop) to 
produce the New Deal and the modern administrative and 
regulatory state (front loop). 
In the environmental arena, too, it is typically periods of 
crisis that stimulate creative and innovative advances in policy 
and management.  Thus it took the Santa Barbara Channel oil 
spill and the Cuyahoga River bursting into flames (back loop) 
to bring about the Clean Water Act (front loop),23 Love Canal to 
produce CERCLA,24 Bhopal to launch the Toxics Release 
Inventory,25 and the Exxon Valdez to spur enactment of the Oil 
Pollution Act.26  Collaborative, adaptive, and integrative 
                                                          
endless repetition of the worst day of his life, covering the annual emergence 
of the groundhog in a backwater town—until the inevitable happy ending. 
 23. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental 
Command and Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 206 (2001). 
 24. Id. at 206 n.83. 
 25. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Third Way Environmentalism, 48 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 801, 818 (2000). 
 26. See Vandenbergh, supra note 23, at 206 n.83. 
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environmental governance institutions have emerged in places 
like the Florida Everglades only when it became clear that 
incremental business-as-usual was not working, the center 
would not hold, and something radically new and different 
needed to be tried.27  In short, we appear to be most open to 
experimentation and new thinking when we are desperate and 
no longer can see the way to answers through accustomed 
modes of thought and familiar patterns of action.  Perhaps that 
is where, at the end of the day, a glimmer of hope is to be found 
in panarchy. 
My friends and sometime collaborators, Chuck Sabel and 
Bill Simon, have written provocatively about a legal approach 
they call “destabilization rights.”28  In Sabel and Simon’s view, 
sometimes it becomes necessary to use litigation to pull the 
plug on an established institutional arrangement when it 
becomes clear the institution is failing on one or more 
important dimensions of performance, and political blockage is 
preventing a significant correction through ordinary 
governmental processes.29  Increasingly, Sabel and Simon 
argue, judges in “public law litigation” cases—typically 
constitutional or statutory civil rights or civil liberties cases 
seeking major institutional reforms of public schools, prisons, 
criminal justice systems, social welfare programs, and the 
like—recognize that they are not well-positioned to impose 
comprehensive institutional reform blueprints from the bench 
given the limitations of judicial competence and expertise 
coupled with limitations on the courts’ ability to craft and 
effectively enforce a new institutional order on a resistant, 
entrenched, governmental defendant.30  So instead judges seek 
                                                          
 27. See generally Alfred R. Light, Ecosystem Restoration in the Everglades, 
14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 166 (2000) (describing how an ambitious federal-
state collaborative Everglades ecosystem restoration plan emerged out of the 
settlement of an acrimonious lawsuit over water quality standards which had 
taxed the resources of both state and federal governments without producing 
improvements in environmental quality). 
 28. See generally Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization 
Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004). 
 29. Id. at 1062 (stating that the “prima facie case for public law 
destabilization has two elements: failure to meet standards and political 
blockage”). 
 30. Id. at 1053 (“Courts found they lacked both the information and the 
depth and range of control to properly formulate and enforce command-and-
control injunctions” which “exacerbated resistance on the part of defendants — 
or at least, top-down measures had little capacity to neutralize such 
resistance.”). 
KARKKAINEN_FINAL_755.DOCFINAL 01/09/2006  12:40:59 PM 
68 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 7:1 
 
to disentrench and destabilize the offending institution, 
ordering its disestablishment and setting out only very general 
performance standards for its reconstituted successor, leaving 
the hard work of institutional redesign to the defendant 
government but retaining jurisdiction to review its progress 
and to order additional reforms if necessary.31  This judicially 
imposed destabilization, Sabel and Simon argue, often opens 
the door to creative, multiparty collaborations in the 
institutional redesign and reform effort, leading to a new and 
improved institutional synthesis.  In short, Sabel and Simon’s 
“destabilization rights” look like a judicially triggered 
mechanism to get to panarchy’s back loop, where creativity 
may flourish. 
Citizen suits can sometimes perform a similar function in 
environmental law.  Litigation—or sometimes the mere 
background threat of litigation—has created legal, political, 
and institutional crises that have forced parties to come 
together in new and sometimes surprising reconfigurations in 
the Florida Everglades, the San Francisco Bay-Delta, the 
southern California coastal sage scrub, and the Pacific 
Northwest, among others.  In all these cases, legal 
destabilization of established ways of doing business opened 
the door to a new back-loop period of creative ferment, 
reorganization, and institutional innovation.  The panarchy 
thesis suggests that the new institutional configurations that 
emerge out of this process can be expected to advance in their 
turn through a normal front-loop cycle of growth, consolidation, 
and predictability, eventually to become unstable and collapse 
at unexpected times and in unanticipated ways into new back 
loops of creative destruction. 
These examples suggest an intriguing prospect: suppose we 
intentionally seek to build back-loop cycles of destabilization 
and back-loop reconfiguration into larger front-loop cycles of 
institutional growth and consolidation?  Then the inevitable 
destabilization and collapse of front-loop processes need not 
look so frightening or debilitating.  From that perspective, the 
panarchic double-loop comes to represent not the futile labor of 
Sisyphus, but a recurring cyclical pattern of alternating 
opportunities for back-loop creativity and front-loop 
consolidation—and maybe, just maybe, the opportunity for 
                                                          
 31. Id. at 1067-73 (describing the general outlines of experimentalist 
remedies in destabilization rights cases). 
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progress over time, as each turn around the double-loop 
incorporates and builds on learning from past trips. 
Moreover, the theory also suggests that it may be possible 
to build smaller, controlled cycles of destabilization and back-
loop creative reconfiguration into larger scale forward-loop 
processes, building toward greater order at the larger scale 
while learning as we go through a series of small-scale 
disturbances and innovations.  That, in a sense, is what 
adaptive management—as Holling originally conceived it—is 
all about: creating small, controlled perturbations in the system 
through carefully crafted, hypothesis-testing management 
interventions, and incorporating the learning thus generated 
into forward-loop incremental improvements in management at 
the larger system-wide scale.  Yet surely there will be large-
scale surprises as well, leading at times to destabilization 
across the larger-scale system.  The lesson of panarchy, 
however, is not to worry: change is inevitable, but back-loop 
destabilization is both an inevitable part of the cycle of change, 
as well as an extraordinary learning opportunity, a time when 
conditions are ripest for creativity to flourish and for learning 
to advance in great strides through creative recombination.  
Maybe this carnival ride will be fun after all. 
II. ADAPTING LAW TO ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 
That brings me to J.B. Ruhl’s thoughtful and important 
contribution, entitled Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is 
It Possible?.32  Ruhl argues persuasively that adaptive 
management is fundamentally incompatible with our present 
paradigm of administrative law.  It is only at the end of the 
paper, however, that Ruhl finally takes a stand in favor of 
modifying administrative law to accommodate adaptive 
management, rather than simply concluding that adaptive 
management is impossible in practice—a conclusion to which 
many administrative law scholars come to far too easily, as if 
administrative law were somehow immutable and eternal, or at 
least of constitutional stature, rather than just another 
statutory and judge-made legal artifact that may prove 
maladaptive at some point. 
I have no basic disagreement with Ruhl’s thesis, but I do 
have a couple of comments.  First, I would urge that we pay 
closer attention to the forms and varieties of adaptive 
                                                          
 32. Ruhl, supra note 10. 
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management.  A common theme in the scientific literature on 
adaptive management is the distinction between its “passive” 
and “active” forms.  Carl Walters, a noted fisheries biologist, 
adaptive management theorist and practitioner, and frequent 
collaborator with Buzz Holling, defines “active” adaptive 
management as a “deliberate probing for information” through 
a multistep process involving integrative ecological modeling, 
conscious generation of testable scientific hypotheses, and field 
experimentation through carefully tailored management 
interventions designed to test specific hypotheses.33  “Active” 
adaptive management is, then, as much about harnessing 
management interventions in the pursuit of science as it is 
about harnessing advancing knowledge in the interest of sound 
management.34 
In contrast, “passive” adaptive management is a simpler 
process involving heightened monitoring of key indicators, 
leading to subsequent adjustments in policies in light of what 
may be learned through careful observation and data 
generation, and without the “deliberate probing” of active, 
hypothesis-testing experimentation.35  Even “passive” adaptive 
management is, in Walter’s view, far superior to old-fashioned 
“trial-and-error” approaches in which the manager simply tries 
out a policy thought likely to succeed and then abandons it in 
favor of an alternative course of action if the first attempt 
fails.36  Clearly, however, Walters sees a hierarchy of methods, 
preferring “active” to “passive” adaptive management wherever 
the former is possible. 
It is the “passive” form of adaptive management that 
appears to have gained the greatest foothold in natural 
resources management, however, and that is the form to which 
J.B. Ruhl refers in his paper.  Ruhl offers his own rough-and-
ready definition.  The “essence” of adaptive management, he 
says, is “an iterative, incremental decisionmaking process built 
around a continuous process of monitoring the effects of 
decisions and adjusting decisions accordingly.”37  That 
definition comes very close to capturing Walters’ notion of 
                                                          
     33. CARL WALTERS, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES 
232 (1986). 
 34. See id. at 64, 232. 
 35. See id. at 232, 248-52. 
 36. See id. at 64 (characterizing “trial-and-error” as a process of “blind 
probing” without model-building and hypothesis-testing). 
 37. Ruhl, supra note 10, at 28. 
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“passive” adaptive management, turning as it does on 
monitoring and subsequent adjustment of policies.  Ruhl also 
cites definitions by biologist Simon Lewin and the National 
Research Council that also track the “passive” rather than the 
“active” form of adaptive management.38  None of these 
formulations comes close to the highly structured and 
rigorously science-driven form of “active” adaptive management 
advanced by Walters and Holling as a disciplined way of field-
testing specific and carefully formulated scientific hypotheses. 
As applied in the real world of natural resources 
management, however, what passes under the banner of 
“adaptive management” often does not even rise to the level of 
“passive” adaptive management as Walters defines it.  For 
example, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)—
the federal agency in charge of most Endangered Species Act 
implementation and enforcement—uses its own idiosyncratic 
definition of “adaptive management” within its Habitat 
Conservation Plan (HCP) program.  FWS defines adaptive 
management as consisting of a series of pre-specified 
contingency measures that will be adopted at pre-specified 
triggering thresholds if the initial effort fails to produce the 
expected results.39  Thus, for example, an approved HCP may 
specify that if the population of a protected butterfly falls below 
a specified level, the landowner will be required to spend an 
additional thirty percent beyond sums already irrevocably 
                                                          
 38. See id. at 28 n.14 (citing Lewin’s definition of adaptive management); 
id. (citing National Research Council description of adaptive management);  
see also id. at 29 (describing an eight-step process of adaptive management); 
id. at 34 (schematizing adaptive management as a four-stage continuous loop 
process).  “Active” adaptive management as defined by Walters would include 
the development of specific, testable scientific hypotheses and the design and 
implementation of management measures carefully tailored to test those 
hypotheses, steps mentioned nowhere in any of the definitions or description 
of adaptive management cited by Ruhl. 
 39. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., 
ENDANGERED SPECIES HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK 3-25 
(1996) (stating that adaptive management plans in HCPs should specify 
triggering thresholds and “a clear understanding and agreement” as to the 
“range of adjustments which might be required”); U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. & 
Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the 
Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting 
Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242, 35,253 (June 1, 2000) (stating that if an HCP 
“incorporate[s] an adaptive management strategy, it should clearly state the 
range of possible operating conservation program adjustments due to 
significant new information, risk, or uncertainty,” and that this range “defines 
the limits of what resource commitments may be required of the permittee”). 
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committed for purposes of removing additional invasive 
vegetation and replanting with native vegetation.  As one 
commentator succinctly put it, “another word for adaptive 
management” as practiced by the FWS “is ‘contingency 
planning.’”40 
Now contingency planning may be a step up in 
sophistication from old-fashioned management by “trial-and-
error” (or “muddling through”), but it does not have the open 
texture, flexibility, unboundedness, and openness to surprise 
and unanticipated changes contemplated by advocates of 
adaptive management.  Not only does it lack the scientific rigor 
and experimental flavor of “active” adaptive management, but 
it does not even rise to the level of “passive” adaptive 
management as described by Walters.  It is probably not fairly 
characterized as “adaptive management” at all on most 
standard definitions of that term.  To use the term Ruhl 
borrows from Shapiro and Glicksman,41 “contingency planning” 
is at heart just a slightly more complex form of “front-end” 
decisionmaking, modified only by a relatively narrow and 
inflexible range for “back-end” adjustments—within 
parameters specified at the front end—when certain triggering 
thresholds (also specified at the front end) are met.  
Contingency planning, in short, offers little opportunity for 
learning and even less for rigorous scientific experimentation; 
ordinarily these are much more open-textured undertakings. 
Be aware, then, that when FWS says “adaptive 
management,” it is using the term as an idiosyncratic term-of-
art for ordinary contingency planning.  When Buzz Holling and 
Carl Walters use the term “adaptive management,” they mean 
something very different and are generally referring to a 
rigorously scientific form of “active” adaptive management, 
unless they specify that they are talking about the “passive” 
variety.  When J.B. Ruhl and the National Research Council 
use the term, they are using it in yet another sense, to mean 
what Walters calls “passive” adaptive management.  These 
varied uses of the term invite confusion. 
                                                          
 40. Gregory A. Thomas, Where Property Rights and Biodiversity Converge 
Part III:  Incorporating Adaptive Management and the Precautionary Principle 
into HCP Design, 18 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, 32, 33 (2001). 
 41. Ruhl, supra note 10, at 30 & n.18 (citing SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & 
ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC 
APPROACH (2003) for the distinction between “front-end” and “back-end” 
decisionmaking). 
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My point here is more than a mere syntactical one.  We 
need to be careful how we use the term “adaptive 
management.”  Participants in the debate over its meaning and 
merits often end up talking past each other, because different 
people are using the same term to mean very different things.  
A little more precision is advised. 
Perhaps this explains, in part, the apparent paradox that 
lies at the heart of FWS’s HCP program, which professes 
simultaneously to embrace both “adaptive management” and a 
“no surprises” policy, the latter offering firm assurances to 
landowners that more will not be demanded of them at the 
“back end” than they agree to accept at the “front end” of the 
planning process.  FWS insists these two principles are not in 
conflict.  J.B. Ruhl agrees with that statement, arguing that if 
the landowner agrees at the front end to an HCP containing an 
adaptive management provision, that landowner cannot later 
claim at the back end to be “surprised” if the learning 
generated by adaptive management leads to a call for new 
actions—because that is precisely what the landowner agreed 
to.42  But Ruhl’s conception of (“passive”) adaptive management 
is far more open-ended than FWS’s notion of adaptive-
management-as-contingency-planning.  If “adaptive 
management” means nothing more than a limited form of 
contingency planning, then adaptive management and no 
surprises are obviously not in conflict, because the full range of 
possible outcomes, and the conditions that will trigger each of 
them, have already been fully specified at the front end.  There 
is no conflict, but there is also no adaptive management in the 
open-ended but “passive” sense advanced by J.B. Ruhl, much 
less in the “active” scientific-experimentational sense advanced 
by Buzz Holling and Carl Walters.  We are simply comparing 
apples, oranges, and pears and calling them all “apples.” 
I have no reason to question J.B. Ruhl’s larger claim that 
the adversarial and litigious character of contemporary 
administrative law coupled with its overall tendency toward 
nitpicking enforcement of fixed “command-and-control” rules—-
especially procedural rules, which are singularly easy for courts 
to enforce—and its reluctance to countenance uncertainty and 
lack of information as the basis for agency decisionmaking are 
all profoundly at odds with the very concept of adaptive 
management.  That strikes me as not only plausible, but very 
                                                          
 42. See Ruhl, supra note 10, at 47-48. 
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probable, and it is a very serious problem because it places law 
squarely at odds with science, a very uncomfortable place for 
environmental law in particular to find itself. 
I do question, however, whether HCPs are the case that 
best illustrates Ruhl’s point.  If I am right that FWS’s crabbed 
and idiosyncratic interpretation of “adaptive management” as a 
narrowly circumscribed form of front-end contingency planning 
should not count as true “adaptive management” at all (on 
standard definitions of that term), then it appears that FWS 
may never have really tried to incorporate genuine adaptive 
management (as the rest of us know it) into the HCP process.  
In short, HCPs are not adaptive because FWS has never really 
tried to make them adaptive, and not because environmental 
plaintiffs have knocked out a few HCPs on administrative law 
grounds.  It is premature to declare the policy experiment a 
failure, because we have not yet conducted the experiment—at 
least, not in the HCP context. 
That does nothing to make things easier for adaptive 
management, however.  It only leads me to conclude that, so 
far, FWS has determined it must “talk the talk” by using the 
language of adaptive management to try to justify its policies to 
the scientific community and other informed observers, but it 
has not yet “walked the walk” by actually implementing a 
meaningful form of adaptive management in practice.  It is 
entirely possible, though I do not know for sure, that it is not 
the presence of genuine adaptive management in the cases Ruhl 
describes, but rather its absence, that led to lawsuits. 
In the beach mouse case, for example,43 the agency’s 
position seems to have been that we genuinely do not know 
what the impact of the proposed development on the protected 
species will be, but we will promise only to make upward or 
downward adjustments in mitigation measures within a pre-
specified range, whether or not adjustments in that range will 
be sufficient to protect the species.  In such circumstances, a 
lawsuit by environmentalists claiming that the agency is not 
entitled to reach a “finding of no significant impact” (FONSI) 
when it has in effect admitted that there could be a significant 
adverse impact on a species protected by the Endangered 
Species Act seems entirely reasonable.  If, on the other hand, 
the HCP had incorporated a more open-ended form of adaptive 
management, promising to make whatever adjustments were 
                                                          
 43. See Ruhl, supra note 10, at 51-52 nn.98-99. 
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necessary to maintain a viable population in light of what is 
revealed by monitoring or scientific hypothesis testing, then the 
agency would have a more plausible claim to a FONSI, and 
environmentalists would presumably have less room for 
complaint, either on procedural grounds or with respect to the 
substantive outcome.  In the agency’s calculation, however, the 
No Surprises principle trumps genuine adaptive management; 
No Surprises is compatible only with the faux adaptive-
management-as-limited-contingency-planning that the agency 
idiosyncratically advocates, and it is the application of that 
policy that both inspires the environmentalists’ distrust and 
invites their lawsuit. 
My second point is briefer.  J.B. Ruhl argues that we are 
still a long way from drafting a National Adaptive Management 
Act.44  That is surely right, but merely raising the idea is a 
positive contribution.  After all, adaptive management is at 
bottom a set of procedural principles—simultaneously a method 
of inquiry and a procedural mechanism of agency 
decisionmaking, based on rigorous observation through 
monitoring (“passive”) and experimentation (“active”), 
reassessment, and adjustment in light of what is learned.  It 
also requires a particular kind of justification—scientific 
justification based on integrative cross-disciplinary modeling 
and monitoring data—for changes in policies and 
implementation measures.  In principle, at least, it does not 
seem so very difficult a prospect to reduce those procedures and 
modes of justification to a set of administrative law principles 
aimed at providing the transparency, accountability, and 
“objective boundaries” that are currently lacking.  To be sure, 
those legal principles will diverge from the familiar 
administrative law principles that we have all come to know 
and love, or in some cases to loathe.  But that does seem a 
manageable task.  One might even envision administrative law 
proceeding on two tracks: ordinarily the familiar “fixed rule” 
track will apply, except in circumstances where the agency can 
justify, according to well-understood standards, shifting to the 
adaptive management track, and at that point a second set of 
adaptive management administrative law principles would kick 
in, requiring different procedures and further justifications for 
changes in the course of action.  It all sounds a bit 
bureaucratic, but perhaps that is the price we must pay to 
                                                          
 44. Id. at 54. 
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reconcile science and law.  Thoughtful, scientifically attuned 
lawyers like J.B. Ruhl will surely have a central role to play in 
working this all out, but it strikes me as a valuable and 
exciting project. 
Ruhl makes a further contribution, introducing the 
concepts of “volatility” and “drift” to set some outer boundaries 
on back-end adjustments that would escape “obtrusive public 
participation and judicial review.”45  This is a creative and 
novel suggestion, worthy of careful consideration.  My initial 
reaction, though, is a bit skeptical.  Ruhl would confine early 
changes in position to a narrow range (to constrain volatility), 
gradually expanding the permissible range of volatility over 
time, until an outer maximum range of permissible deviation 
from the initial position is reached (to constrain drift).  This 
appears to leave room for much larger lurches in position as 
one proceeds outward in time from the starting point.  It is not 
clear, however why large changes are more acceptable if they 
occur later in time, rather than early.  In the beach mouse case, 
for example, suppose early monitoring results indicate that the 
initial course of action is causing dramatic declines in the 
species, requiring early large-scale management adjustments to 
prevent ecological disaster.  Those kinds of problems might just 
as plausibly show up early as late.  On the other hand, if 
management is maintaining a steady course for a long period of 
time, it might suggest that whatever management measures 
are being pursued are actually working fairly well.  From that 
perspective, large deviations from a long-established and 
apparently successful course of management action look every 
bit as suspicious as earlier ones, and should be entitled to no 
more deference. 
On the other hand, ecological science has proven itself 
capable of generating very large surprises at any time.  
Sometimes we come to appreciate that our actions have been 
predicated upon very basic misunderstandings of ecosystem 
dynamics, necessitating large-scale corrections.  There is no 
particular reason to think those kinds of lurching advances in 
science will come sooner, or later, in the process.  Genuine 
adaptive management is almost certain to be somewhat 
volatile, but unpredictably so as to when volatility will be 
required, if we give it a chance to work.  Nor is “drift” outside 
predetermined parameters necessarily a bad thing, if it is 
                                                          
 45. See id. at 55-56. 
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predicated upon real advances in scientific understanding.  So 
it is a little hard to see just what is added by using the concepts 
of “drift” and “volatility” as the basis for determining when to 
allow citizen participation and judicial review, however creative 
and intuitively appealing the concepts may be. 
At bottom, I suspect all this goes to the question of what 
counts as justification.  The question is not how much do we 
want to allow agencies to depart from an initial course of 
action, because we cannot presume that a smaller departure is 
the sounder course of action, or that only small departures are 
justifiable early but larger departures are necessarily 
justifiable later.  The question is when do we want to allow 
such departures, of whatever magnitude.  The answer, in 
general, is when the departures are justified by advances in 
scientific understanding.  That is what adaptive management 
is all about, and that is the principle to which we must make 
administrative law adapt if we are to bring environmental law 
and policy into congruence with contemporary ecological 
science. 
 
